Дуглас Норт - Насилие и социальные порядки
Thompson, F.M.L. (1966) The social distribution of landed property in England since the sixteenth century. Economic History Review, Second series 19, 505–517.
Thome, S.E. (1959). English feudalism and estates in land. Cambridge Law Journal, 193–209.
Thrupp, S. (1948). The merchant class of medieval London 1300–1500. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Tiebout, Charles. (1956). A pure theory of local expenditures. Journal of Political Economy, 64 (5), 416-24.
Tierney, Brian. (1955 [1968]). Foundations of the conciliar theory. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Tilly, Charles. (1992). Coercion, capital, and European states: 990-1992. Maiden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
Tilly, Charles. (1996). Citizenship, identity, and social history. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Tilly, Charles. (2005a). Trust and rule. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Tilly, Charles. (2005b). Identities, boundaries, and social ties. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
de Tocqueville, Alexis. (1969 [1835]). Democracy in America. New York: Doubleday Anchor.
Tombs, Robert. (1996). France 1814–1914, New York: Longman.
Trenchard, John, and Gordon, Thomas. (1995). Cato’s letters. (Ronald Hamowry, Ed.). Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Trigger, Bruce G. (2003). Understanding early civilizations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Truman, David. (1952). The governmental process. New York: Alfred Knopf.
Tsebelis, George. (2002). Veto players: How political institutions work. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Tufte, Edward R. (1978). Political control over the economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
UUman, Walter. (1969). The Carolingian renaissance and the idea of kingship. London: Methuen & Co.
Ullman, Walter. (1972a [1938]). The origins of the great schism. Hamden, CT: Archon Books.
Ullman, Walter. (1972b). A short history of the papacy in the Middle Ages. New York: Routledge.
Ullman, Walter. (1975). Law and politics in the Middle Ages. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Van Gelderen, Martin, and Skinner, Quentin. (2002). Republicanism: A shared European heritage, 2 volumes. NewYork: Cambridge University Press.
Veitch, John M. (1986). Repudiations and confiscations by the medieval state. Journal ofEconomic History, 46 (1): 31–36.
Vinogradoff, Paul. (1905). The growth ofthe manor. London: Swan Son- nenschein & Co.
Vinogradoff, Paul. (1908). English society in the eleventh century: Essays in medieval history. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Vinogradoff, Paul. (1923). Villainage in England: Essays in medieval history. New York: Russell & Russell.
Wallace, Michael. (1968). Changing concepts of party in the United States, 1815–1828. American Historical Review, 74 (2), 453–491.
Wallis, John Joseph. (2003). Market augmenting government? The state and the corporation in 19th century America. In Omar Azfar and Charles Cadwell (Eds), Market-augmenting government: The institutional foundations for prosperity. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Wallis, John Joseph. (2005). Constitutions, corporations, and corruption: American states and constitutional change, 1842 to 1852. Journal of Economic History, 65 (1), 211–256.
Wallis, John Joseph. (2006). The concept of systematic corruption in American economic and political history. In Edward Glaeser and Claudia Goldin (Eds), Corruption and reform. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Wallis, John Joseph. (2009). NBER/Maryland Constitution Project, http:/7 www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu.
Wallis, John Joseph, Sylla, Richard, and Leglerjohn. (1994). The interaction of taxation and regulation in nineteenth century banking. In Claudia Goldin and Gary Libecap (Eds), The regulated economy: An historical approach to political economy (pp. 121–144). Chicago: NBER/University of Chicago Press.
Wallis, John Joseph, and Weingast, Barry. (2005). Equilibrium federal impotence: Why the states and not the American national government financed infrastructure investment in the antebellum era. NBER Working PaperNo. 11397.
Wallis, John Joseph, and Weingast, Barry. (2008). Dysfunctional or optimal institutions?: State debt limitations, the structure of state and local governments, and the finance of American infrastructure. In Elizabeth Garret, Elizabeth Graddy, and Howell Jackson (Eds), Fiscal challenges. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Wallis, John Joseph, Weingast, Barry R., and North, Douglass C. (2006, September). The corporate origins of individual rights. Paper presented at the Economic History Association Meeting.
Waugh, Scott L. (1986). Tenure to contract: Lordship and clientage in thirteenth-century England. English Historical Review, 101 (401), 811–839.
Webb, Sidney, and Webb, Beatrice Potter. (1908). English local government from the revolution to the Municipal Corporations Act. New York: Longmans, Green, 1908.
Weber, Max. (1947). The theory of social and economic organization. NewYork: Free Press.
Weingast, Barry К (1995). The economic role of political institutions: Market-preserving federalism and economic development. Journal ofLaw, Economics, and Organization, 11, 1-31.
Weingast, Barry R. (1997). The political foundations of democracy and the rule of law. American Political Science Review, 91 (2), 245–263.
Weingast, Barry R. (1998). Political stability and civil war: Institutions, commitment, and American democracy. In Robert Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry R. Weingast (Eds), Analytic narratives. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Weingast, Barry R. (2002). Rational choice institutionalism. In Ira Katznel- son and Helen V. Milner (Eds), Political science, state of the discipline: Reconsidering power, choice, and the state. New York: Norton.
Weingast, Barry R. (November, 2006a). Self-enforcing constitutions: With an application to democratic stability in America’s first century. Working Paper, Hoover Institution.
Weingast, Barry R. (November, 2006b). Second-generation fiscal federalism: Implications for decentralized democratic governance and economic development. Working Paper, Hoover Institution.
Weiss, Thomas. (1992). U.S. labor force estimates and economic growth, 1800 to 1860. In Robert E.Gallman and John Joseph Wallis (Eds), American economic growth and standards of living before the Civ- ilWar. Chicago: NBER/University of Chicago Press.
Wells, Colin. (1992). The Roman Empire, second edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Widner, Jennifer A. (2001). Building the rule of law. New York: W.W.Norton.
Williamson, Oliver O. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press.
Wintrobe, Ronald. (1998). The political economy of dictatorship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wolin, Sheldon. (2004). Politics and vision (expanded edition). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Wood, Gordon. (1969). Creation of the American republic. Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press.
Worley, TedR. (1949). Arkansas and the money crisis of 1836–1837. Journal of Southern History, 15 (2), 178–191.
Worley, TedR (1950). The control ofthe real estate bank ofthe state of Arkansas, 1836–1855. Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 37 (3), 403–426.
Wren, Anne. (2006). Comparative perspectives on the role of the state in the economy. In Barry R. Weingast and Donald Wittman (Eds), Handbook of political economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wright, Robert. (2008). Corporate entrepreneurship and economic growth in America, 1790–1860. Paper presented at the Economic History Association meetings, New Haven.
Yojfee, Norman. (2005). The myth of the archaic state: Evolution of the earliest cities, states, and civilizations. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Zorita, Alonso de. (1963 [1570]). Life and labor in ancient Mexico. (Benjamin Keen, Trans.). New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
AcemogluD., RobinsonJ. A. Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press. 2006; Асемоглу Д., Po- бинсонДж. Экономические истоки диктатуры и демократии. М.:
Примечания
1
North D. С. Autobiography (http://nobelprize.org/nobeLprizes/eco- nomi'cs/laureates/ 1993/north.html). Как признавался в автобиографии Норт, в жизни его занимают далеко не только исследования. К вопросам, достойным внимания, Норт относит охоту и рыбалку, жизнь на ранчо, вкусную еду, хорошее вино и концерты симфонической музыки.
2
North D. С. Sources of Productivity Change in Ocean Shipping//Journal of Political Economy. 1968. Vol.76. № 5. P. 953–970.; North D. C., Thomas R. The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History. Cambridge University Press. 1973.
3
North D. C. Structure and Change in Economic History. N. Y.; London: W.W.Norton & Co., 1991; НортД. Институты, институциональные изменения и функционирование экономики, 1997.
4
НортД. "Понимание процесса экономических изменений. М.: Изд. дом ГУ-ВШЭ, 2009.
5
FieldA. Understanding the Process ofEconomic Change: Book Review (http://eh.net/bookreviews/library/0 899).
6
North D. C. and WallisJ. Measuring the Transaction Sector in the American Economy// Long-term factors in American Economic Growth/ Ed. by S. Engerman and R. Gallman. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1986. P. 95–148.♦Carruthers В. Politics, Popery, and Property: A Comment on North and Weingast//Journal of Economic History. Vol. L. № 3. (Sept. 1990). P. 693–698.
7
См. философское обсуждение проблемы насилия в современном обществе: Жижек С. О насилии. М.: Европа, 2010.
8
Изд. дом ГУ-ВШЭ,2011.
9
См.: НортД. Понимание процесса экономических изменений. С. 182–208.
10
Узйнгаст, Б. Почему развивающиеся страны так сопротивляются верховенству закона?//Прогнозис. № 2. 2009. С. 135–163.
11
НортД. Понимание процесса экономических изменений… С. 239.
