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Тьерри Мейссан - 11 сентября 2001

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Tower foundations beneath the substructure consisted of massive spread footings, socketed into and bearing directly on the massive bedrock. Steel grillages, consisting of layers of orthogonally placed steel beams, were used to transfer the immense column loads, in bearing, to the reinforced concrete footings.


2.1.3 Fire Protection

The fire safety of a building is provided by a system of interdependent fire protection features, including suppression systems, detection systems, notification devices, smoke management systems, and passive systems such as compartmentation and structural protection. The failure of any of these fire protection systems will impact the effectiveness of the other systems in the building.


2.1.3.1 Passive Protection

In WTC 1, structural elements up to the 39th floor were originally protected from fire with a spray applied product containing asbestos (Nicholson, et al. 1980). These asbestos-containing materials were later abated inside the building, either through encapsulation or replacement. On all other floors and throughout WTC 2, a spray-applied, asbestos-free mineral fiber material was used. Each element of the steel floor trusses was protected with spray-applied material. The specific material used was a low-density, factory-mixed product consisting of manufactured inorganic fibers, proprietary cement-type binders, and other additives in low concentrations to promote wetting, set, and dust control. Air setting, hydraulic setting, and ceramic setting binders were added in varying quantities and combinations or singly at the site, depending on the particular application and weather conditions. Finally, water was added at the nozzle of the spray gun as the material was sprayed onto the member to be protected. The average thickness of spray-applied fire proofing on the trusses was 3/4 inch. In the mid-1990s, a decision was made to upgrade the fire protection by applying additional material onto the trusses so as to increase fire proofing thickness to 1-1/2 inches (somehow, I doubt that 3 inches (1-1/2 inches «either side») of fire proofing would stick to the 1.09 inch diagonal rod of the trusses). The fire proofing upgrade was applied to individual floors as they became vacant. By September 11, 2001, a total of 31 stories had been upgraded, including the entire impact zone in WTC 1 (floors 94-98), but only the 78th floor in the impact zone in WTC 2 (floors 78-84).

Spandrels and girders were specified to have sufficient protection to achieve a 3-hour rating. Except for the interior face of perimeter columns between spandrels, which were protected with a plaster material, spray applied materials similar to those used on the floor systems were used. The thickness of protection on spandrels and girders varied, with the more massive steel column sections receiving reduced fire proofing thickness relative to the thinner elements.

The primary vertical compartmentation was provided by the floor slabs that were cast flush against the spandrel beams at the exterior wall, providing separation between floors at the building perimeter. After a fire in 1975 (note that this fire did not cause the building to collapse) vertical penetrations for cabling and plumbing were sealed with fire-resistant material. At stair and elevator shafts, separation was provided by a wall system constructed of metal studs and two layers of 5/8– inch thick gypsum board on the exterior and one layer of 5/8-inch thick gypsum board on the interior. These assemblies provided a 2-hour rating. Horizontal compartmentation varied throughout the complex. Some separating walls ran from slab to slab, while others extended only up to the suspended ceiling. A report by the New York Board of Fire Underwriters (NYBFU) titled One World Trade Center Fire, February 13, 1975 (NYBFU 1975) presents a detailed discussion of the compartmentation features of the building at that time.


2.1.3.2 Suppression

When originally constructed, the two towers were not provided with automatic fire sprinkler protection. However, such protection was installed as a retrofit circa 1990, and automatic sprinklers covered nearly 100 percent of WTC 1 and WTC 2 at the time of the September 11 attacks. In addition, each building had standpipes running through each of its three stairways. A 1.5-inch hose line and a cabinet containing two air pressurized water (APW) extinguishers were also present at each floor in each stairway.

The primary water supply was provided by a dedicated fire yard main that looped around most of the complex. This yard main was supplied directly from the municipal water supply. Two remotely located high pressure, multi-stage, 750-gallons per minute (gpm) electrical fire pumps took suction from the New York City municipal water supply and produced the required operating pressures for the yard main.

Each tower had three electrical fire pumps that provided additional pressure for the standpipes. One pump, located on the 7th floor, received the discharge from the yard main fire pumps and moved it up to the 41st floor, where a second 750-gpm fire pump pushed it up to a third pump on the 75th floor. Each fire pump produced sufficient pressure to supply water to the pump two stages up from it in the event that any one pump should fail. Several 5,000-gallon storage tanks, filled from the domestic water system, provided a secondary water supply. Tanks on the 41st, 75th, and 110th floors provided water directly to a standpipe system. A tank on the 20th floor supplied water directly to the yard main. Numerous Fire Department of New York (FDNY) connections were located around the complex to allow the fire department to boost water pressure in the buildings.


2.1.3.3 Smoke Management

A zoned smoke control system was built into each building's ventilation systems and was activated upon direction of the responding FDNY Incident Commander. The system was designed to limit smoke spread from the tenant areas to the core area, thereby assisting both individuals evacuating from an area and those responding to the scene by limiting smoke spread into the core.


2.1.3.4 Fire Department Features

At the time of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, a centralized Fire Command Center (FCC) for the two towers was present at the Concourse level. This FCC was located in the B-1 level Operations Control Center (OCC). Following the 1993 bombing, additional FCCs were installed in the lobbies of each tower.

A Radiax cable and antenna were installed in the WTC complex to facilitate the use of FDNY radios in the towers. Fire department telephones were provided in both towers on odd floors in Stairway 3, as well as on levels B-1, B-4, and B-6.

The WTC had its own fire brigade, consisting of Port Authority police officers trained in fire safety, who worked with the FDNY to investigate fire conditions and take appropriate actions. The internal fire brigade had access to fire carts located on the Concourse level and on the 44th and 78th floor sky lobbies of each tower. These fire carts were equipped with hoses, nozzles, self-contained breathing apparatus, turnout coats, forcible entry tools, resuscitators, first-aid kits, and other emergency equipment. Typically, the WTC fire brigade would collect the nearest fire cart and set up operations on the floor below the fire floor.

The WTC complex had 24 Siamese connections located at street level for use by the FDNY apparatus. Each of these Siamese connections served various portions of the complex and was identified as such.


2.1.4 Emergency Egress

Each tower was provided with three independent emergency fire exit stairways, located in the core of the building, as indicated in Figure 2-12. Two of these stairways, designated Stairway 1 and Stairway 2, were 44 inches wide and ran to the 110th floor. The third stairway, designated Stairway 3, had a width of 56 inches and ran to the 108th floor. The stairways did not run in continuous vertical shafts from the top to the bottom of the structure. Instead, the plan location of the stairways shifted at some levels, and occupants traversing the stairways were required to move from one vertical shaft to another through a transfer corridor. Both Stairways 1 and 2 had transfers at the 42nd, 48th, 76th, and 82nd levels. Stairway 1 had an additional transfer at the 26th level and Stairway 3 had a single transfer at the 76th level. After the 1993 bombing, battery-operated emergency lighting was provided in the stairways and photoluminescent paint was placed on the edge of the stair treads to facilitate emergency egress.


Figure 2-12. Floor plan of 94th and 95th floors of WTC 1 showing egress stairways.


There were 99 elevators in each of the two towers, including 23 express elevators; however, the express elevators were not intended to be used for emergency access or egress. There were also several freight elevators servicing groups of floors in the buildings. The several elevators that served each floor were broken into two groups that operated on different power supplies.

Upon alarm activation, an automatic elevator override system commanded all elevators serving or affected by a fire area to immediately return to the ground floor, or to their sky lobby (44th and 78th floors). From there, the elevators could be operated manually by the FDNY. Although many fire departments routinely use elevators to provide better access in high-rise buildings, FDNY does not do this, because there have been fatalities associated with such use.


2.1.5 Emergency Power

Primary power was provided at 13.8 kilovolts (kV) through a ground level substation in WTC 7 near the Barclay Street entrance to the underground parking garage. The primary power was wired to the buildings through two separate systems. The first provided power throughout each building; the second provided power to emergency systems in the event that the primary wiring system failed.

Six 1,200-kilowatt (kW) emergency power generators located in the sixth basement (B-6) level provided a secondary power supply. These generators were checked on a routine basis to ensure that they would function properly during an emergency. This equipment provided backup power for communications equipment, elevators, emergency lighting in corridors and stairwells, and fire pumps. Telephone systems were provided with an independent battery backup system. Emergency lighting units in exit stairways, elevator lobbies, and elevator cabs were equipped with individual backup batteries.


2.1.6 Management Procedures

The Port Authority has a risk management group that coordinates fire and safety activities for their various properties. This group provided training for the WTC fire brigade, fire safety directors, and tenant fire wardens. The WTC had 25 fire safety directors who assisted in the coordination of fire safety activities in the buildings throughout the year. Six satellite communication stations, staffed by deputy fire safety directors, were spaced throughout the towers. In addition, each tenant was required to provide at least one fire warden. Tenants that occupied large areas of the building were required to provide one fire warden for every 7,500 square feet of occupied space. The fire safety directors trained the fire wardens and fire drills were held twice a year.


2.2 Building Response

WTC 1 and WTC 2 each experienced a similar, though not identical, series of loading events. In essence, each tower was subjected to three separate, but related events (actually, there were four separate, but related events, the last being the detonation of a multitude of small explosive charges in each building). The sequence of these events was the same for the two buildings, although the timing was not. In each case, the first loading event was a Boeing 767-200ER series commercial aircraft hitting the building, together with a fireball (Although dramatic, these fireballs did not explode or generate a shock wave. If an explosion or detonation had occurred, the expansion of the burning gasses would have taken place in microseconds, not the 2 seconds observed. Therefore, although there were some overpressures, it is unlikely that the fireballs, being external to the buildings, would have resulted in significant structural damage.) resulting from immediate rapid ignition of a portion of the fuel on board the aircraft. Boeing 767-200ER aircraft have a maximum rated takeoff weight of 395,000 pounds, a wingspan of 156 feet 1 inch, and a rated cruise speed of 530 miles per hour. The aircraft is capable of carrying up to 23,980 gallons of fuel and it is estimated that, at the time of impact, each aircraft had approximately 10,000 gallons of unused fuel on board (compiled from Government sources). Boeing 707-320B aircraft have a maximum rated takeoff weight of 336,000 pounds, a wingspan of 145 feet 9 inches, and a rated cruise speed of 607 miles per hour. The aircraft is capable of carrying over 23,000 gallons of fuel. The Boeing 707 and 767 are very similar aircraft. Under normal flying conditions, a Boeing 707 would smash into a building with about 10 percent more energy than would the slightly heavier Boeing 767. Engineers designed the World Trade Center towers to withstand a collision with a Boeing 707. Hence, they were necessarily designed to survive the impact of a Boeing 767. See The World Trade Center Demolition and Microsoft Software Used To Simulate The Crash Of A Boeing 747 Into The World Trade Centre.

In each case, the aircraft impacts resulted in severe structural damage, including some localized partial collapse, but did not result in the initiation of global collapse. In fact, WTC 1 remained standing for a period of approximately 1 hour and 43 minutes, following the initial impact; WTC 2 remained standing for approximately 56 minutes following impact. The second event was the simultaneous ignition and growth of fires over large floor areas on several levels of the buildings. The fires heated the structural systems and, over a period of time, resulted in additional stressing of the damaged structure, as well as sufficient additional damage and strength loss to initiate the third event, a progressive sequence of failures that culminated in total collapse of both structures. Of course, this does not even begin to explain the total collapse of WTC Seven.


2.2.1 WTC 1

2.2.1.1 Initial Damage From Aircraft Impact

American Airlines Flight 11 struck the north face of WTC 1 approximately between the 94th and 98th floors (Figures 2-13 and 2-14), causing massive damage to the north face of the building within the immediate area (Figure 2-15).


Figure 2-13 Zone of aircraft impact on the north face of WTC 1.


At the central zone of impact corresponding to the airplane fuselage and engines, at least five of the prefabricated, three-column sections that formed the exterior walls were broken loose of the structure, and some were pushed inside the building envelope.


Figure 2-15 Impact damage to the north face of WTC 1.


Locally, floors supported by these exterior wall sections appear to have partially collapsed, losing their support along the exterior wall. Away from this central zone, in areas impacted by the outer wing structures, the exterior columns were fractured by the force of the collision. Interpretation of photographic evidence suggests that from 31 to 36 columns on the north building face were destroyed over portions of a four-story range. Partial collapse of floors in this zone appear to have occurred over a horizontal length of wall of approximately 65 feet, while floors in other portions of the building appear to have remained intact. Figure 2-16 shows the damage to the exterior columns on the impacted face of WTC 1.

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